Where Will Israel's Multifront War End? There May Not Be a Better Day After - 02 octobre 2024
Foreign Affairs
Where Will Israel's Multifront War End?
There May Not Be a Better Day After

Israel's assassination last week of the Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah marked a transformative moment for the Middle East. Under Nasrallah, Hezbollah became Iran's closest ally and critical deterrent force, the central pillar of Tehran's “axis of resistance.” His death was a severe and shocking blow not only to Hezbollah but to the alignment of Iranian-backed forces across the region. For Israel, the killing was a logical, if bold, step up its ladder of escalation. Yesterday, it took the next step—a ground invasion into Lebanon that unleashed a full-scale assault on Hezbollah—all while facing new direct retaliation from Iran, with nearly 200 ballistic missiles launched at Israel this week.

Since the brutal Hamas attack on October 7 nearly a year ago, Israel has consistently demonstrated a willingness to take greater risks in its fight against Hamas's regional backers, including Iran and Hezbollah. Over the last year, Israel has targeted leaders in both Hezbollah and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), systematically killing hundreds of top operatives. It steadily degraded Hezbollah and Iran, judging that although both would maintain low-level conflict, neither wanted a full-scale war with Israel. Domestic dynamics encouraged Israel's operations, too. Many Israelis feel that a return to the pre–October 7 status quo would be unacceptable. A key lesson from the attacks was that Israel could no longer afford merely to manage and contain the threats on its borders. It would need decisive military wins—regardless of the costs.

Israeli leaders thus became highly motivated to restore the country's shattered deterrence and the aura of invincibility punctured by Hamas's attack. Unable to definitively defeat Hamas in Gaza, Israel may see more opportunity in the fight against Hezbollah and Iran. Its military has spent years preparing for a fight on the northern front and, as recent Israeli attacks in Iran and Lebanon have demonstrated, its intelligence services have extensively penetrated both Iranian and Hezbollah networks.
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In the current escalatory environment, U.S. and international efforts to encourage a diplomatic settlement to the war in Lebanon or Gaza are unlikely to succeed, even as calls for a cease-fire have become still more urgent in the face of the new direct confrontation between Israel and Iran. But at the moment Israel is not seeking a diplomatic off-ramp; it is looking for total victory. Adding to the strategic calculations are political considerations that link Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's political survival to continued wars that seem only to boost his popularity and the stability of his governing coaltion.

Nasrallah was a deadly enemy, and Israelis—and many others in the region—rejoiced in his demise. Many Israelis support taking on a weakened Hezbollah in Lebanon, and even opposition leaders favor the Israeli ground operations that are currently underway. But once the exuberance fades—which may occur more quickly than anticipated, as Iranian and Hezbollah attacks responding to Nasrallah's death have forced Israelis across the country into shelters—they may start asking their leaders what victory really means. If victory is escalation and tactical military successes against Hezbollah and Iran, then Israel has indeed succeeded. But this is an ephemeral victory. It carries unpredictable costs and outcomes, and it appears uncoupled from any serious momentum toward peace with the Palestinians—Israel's most serious existential challenge.

After a year of war, there is a real possibility of no better “day after” in Gaza or the rest of the region. Talk in Washington of capitalizing on Nasrallah's death and Iran's weakness to “reshape” the Middle East harks back to the misguided beliefs that drove the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 to disastrous effect. Continued military conflict harms the region, and it harms U.S. interests. Without a change in the current Israeli government, Israel and its neighbors could be moving toward a very different day after: Israeli reoccupation of Gaza and potentially even of southern Lebanon, as well as reinforced control over, if not annexation of, the West Bank. This is a recipe not for victory but for perpetual war.
WAR WAS IN THE MAKING

The risks that the Gaza war could ignite a wider regional conflict, including direct confrontation between Israel and Iran, were apparent from the outset. Hezbollah quickly entered the fray, although perhaps not to the extent Hamas might have wanted. In a show of solidarity, Hezbollah began launching cross-border attacks on northern Israel in the first week of war, and Israel responded with increasingly expansive counterattacks. The uptick in violence led to the displacement of tens of thousands of Israeli and Lebanese civilians on both sides of the border.

Many clung to the illusion that the conflict on the northern front could be contained because no party wanted a full-scale war. Hezbollah largely limited its attacks to targets close to the border, which were within the accepted rules of engagement that the group had formed with Israel after their last war, in 2006. But as the fighting in Gaza dragged on, both Israel and Hezbollah crossed redlines with attacks that reached deeper into Israeli and Lebanese territory and endangered civilians. The casualty count rose, but at a level that suggested the conflict was still containable.

Nevertheless, there was always the risk that full-scale war could erupt in one of two ways. First was the possibility of miscalculation—that an attack by one party would lead to unanticipated casualties and force the other side into an unwanted war. This risk was evident with Israel's attack in early April on an Iranian diplomatic facility in Damascus that killed top Iranian commanders. Israel acknowledged that it had miscalculated, believing the attack would not provoke an Iranian response. But provoke it did; Iran launched its first-ever direct missile attack on Israel. A U.S.-led coalition was able to repel the strike and quickly contain it, but the episode demonstrated how miscalculation can quickly escalate, and also set the stage for the Iranian-Israeli military conflict that is playing out again today.

The other potential path toward full-scale war was a change in strategic calculus—that one of the powers involved would see greater value in waging a war than in avoiding one. This is the mindset that led Israel to scale up its attack on Hezbollah in Lebanon. Although Iran and Hezbollah appeared to believe that a low-grade conflict with Israel was manageable as long as Israel was preoccupied in Gaza, Israel's calculus had already shifted as its attention increasingly turned north during the summer.

An Israeli helicopter firing toward Lebanon, as seen from northern Israel, October 2024
An Israeli helicopter firing toward Lebanon, as seen from northern Israel, October 2024
Gil Eliyahu / Reuters

When it comes to the north, there is far more consensus in Israel's defense establishment and across its political spectrum than there is in the debate over how to deal with Gaza and the remaining hostages. After the Hamas attacks, relying on Israeli missile defenses to protect the country from Hezbollah's massive arsenal no longer seemed sufficient, nor would it be enough to allow displaced Israelis to return home. Israel could not tolerate an active Hezbollah on its border, and it rejected the idea that diplomatic deals proposed by the Americans or the French would alone deter future attacks and force Hezbollah to sufficiently retreat. Moreover, Israel assessed that Hezbollah—and Iran, for that matter—was reluctant to go too far in its military conflict with Israel. Thus, Israel calculated that it could benefit from ambushing both adversaries without facing significant retaliation, an assessment that now appears to have been overly ambitious. Nor did Israel expect much pushback from its allies, given that the United States had imposed few if any constraints on Israeli military activity since October 7. That expectation seems to have held: the United States has continued its full military support of Israel as it expands its campaign into Lebanon and faces new attacks from Iran.

Before Iran's latest missile attack, Israel indicated that it planned only to carry out a limited military operation into Lebanon and not to occupy southern Lebanon again. But there are no guarantees the war will remain limited or short, based on the history of wars between the two countries and given the likely resistance Israel will face from Hezbollah, even in its diminished state, now that it has invaded Lebanese territory. With direct Iranian-Israeli confrontation as the backdrop, the Lebanese war front could intensify further.

Israel may not have intended its mid-September explosion of pagers and walkie-talkies distributed by Hezbollah as the first salvo of a second war. But one way or another, Israel was determined to change the equation with Hezbollah. The question now is how far Israel plans to go. If Gaza is any indication, Lebanon and its people may be facing grueling weeks ahead; one million Lebanese people have already been displaced in a country of just over five million.
THE NEXT TARGET?

Iran faced a dilemma in how to respond to Nasrallah's death and Israel's pummeling of Hezbollah. Its decision to forgo an immediate response to the killing of Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran, in late July, suggested a degree of caution and continued interest in avoiding a wider regional war. For all their enmity toward Israel, Iranian leaders value their own survival above all and understand that a direct war with Israel—one that could involve the United States—might threaten it. Iran and Israel have been engaged for more than a decade in a so-called shadow war marked by assassinations, sabotage, and multiple Israeli attacks on Iran's nuclear and military infrastructure. The only time Iran had attacked Israel openly and directly was last April in what proved to be an unsuccessful attempt to restore Iranian deterrence as the war in Gaza expanded.

But Israel's high-profile attacks over the past two months, from the killing of Haniyeh to the pager attacks and the assassination of Nasrallah, increased pressure within Iran to respond more forcefully to repair its image among its axis partners and to end Israel's winning streak over the past several weeks, which included Israeli strikes against the Houthis in Yemen. Tehran's leaders might also have assessed that, no matter how they responded, Israel was prepared to attack Iran directly, emboldened by the weakened state of Hezbollah, which had been Iran's most lethal deterrent against Israel. Indeed, Netanyahu issued a video statement to the Iranian people (in English) on September 30, in which he categorically stated, “There is nowhere in the Middle East Israel cannot reach.”

Israel is not seeking a diplomatic off-ramp; it is looking for total victory.

Consequently, despite the risks, and no doubt after significant internal debate, Tehran acted on its vow to retaliate, launching missiles at Israel for the second time on October 1. It gave less advanced notice than in April, and its targets included military facilities in heavily populated parts of Israel. As before, Israel's missile defense system—with U.S. military assistance—successfully repelled the attack, limiting the damage and ensuring no Israeli casualties. Netanyahu declared Iran “would pay” for the attack, and U.S. officials promised significant consequences for Iran. Given the direct nature of Iran's strike and Israel's expanding target list, Israeli retaliation is nearly certain. What is less certain is whether this new round of direct Iranian-Israeli confrontation will end as quickly as the April exchange.

With Iran's proxy axis degraded, Israel might decide to seize the opportunity to strike Iran's nuclear facilities or increase the targeting of IRGC commanders, or even Iranian political leaders. There are also logical reasons why Israel may limit its response to another calibrated and targeted strike on Iran, as it did in April, allowing both sides to declare victory and walk back from the brink. U.S. resistance to expanding the war, too, is likely to be significant. Iranian-aligned militia forces in Iraq have already threatened to target U.S. personnel if the United States intervenes, and the Biden administration is certainly not seeking a direct war with Iran. Israel may in any case prefer to revert to its shadow-war tactics, taking advantage of Iran's weakened state. Still, the current escalatory climate and the often unpredictable outcomes of war mean that nothing can be ruled out.

Indeed, some analysts speculate that Iran could respond to the degradation of its alliance network and compensate for its own conventional military weakness by moving toward weaponization of its nuclear program. But such a drastic step would likely be detected and would only increase the risk of more severe and extensive Israeli attacks on the country.
A DARKENING DAY AFTER

Israel has been willing to go to great lengths to weaken Hezbollah and Iran, and it has already made significant strides on those fronts. But the war in Gaza and increased militarization in the West Bank raises the question of how far Israel is prepared to go in the Palestinian territories. The past year suggests that Netanyahu's government is aiming for nothing less than the creation of a new reality on all of Israel's borders.

Policymakers and analysts have been planning for the “day after” since the war began. They hoped that opportunity could emerge from tragedy. Regional and international actors might help the Israelis and the Palestinians finally come to terms and rebuild the West Bank and Gaza after years of neglect. The enormity of the suffering and loss could be a cruel but effective reminder that this conflict could not be ignored, that it would wreak havoc not only on Israelis and Palestinians but also across the entire region, in ways that would touch every corner of the world. It would prove, they hoped, that the only acceptable outcome would be to find a viable political solution that could break the endless cycles of violence.

Tragically, if not predictably, the vision of a peaceful and prosperous day after is slipping ever farther away. The picture instead is one of continued fighting, climbing death tolls, catastrophic physical destruction, mass displacement, and dire humanitarian conditions. Meanwhile, the remaining Israeli hostages who have not been murdered by Hamas continue to languish in the tunnels beneath Gaza.

Beyond these current calamities lies a longer-term consequence that was by no means inevitable. The choices that Netanyahu and his extremist governing coalition are making now could unravel decades of efforts by previous Israeli Prime Ministers Yitzhak Rabin, Ehud Barak, and Ariel Sharon to disengage Israel from Palestinian land. In Gaza, Israeli forces remain deeply entrenched, maintaining control in the Philadelphi corridor on the border with Egypt and preparing for a long-term military presence. In the West Bank, Israeli settlement expansion continues, protected by the Israel Defense Forces and emboldened by Israeli ministers whose ambition is to control the entire territory. IDF incursions into Palestinian cities, such as massive raids in Jenin and Tulkarm, have increased in recent months as control by the Palestinian Authority weakens. An Israeli ground movement into Lebanon has begun, and Israeli leaders and analysts have been discussing the possibility of reinstating a buffer zone in southern Lebanon, similar to the one Israel established after its invasion of Lebanon in 1982 and maintained until Israel's unilateral withdrawal in 2000.

If these operations continue, Israel could, by design or by default, end up reoccupying parts or all of Gaza, the West Bank, and even southern Lebanon. Needless to say, this is a far darker day after than many envisioned. But it is a real possibility with potentially dire repercussions. Reoccupations would threaten Israel's longer-term security, quash Palestinian aspirations for independence and dignity, and destabilize the entire region.
FORK IN THE ROAD

Israel's degradation of Hezbollah will deepen an already entrenched belief among many Israeli leaders and people that only military force can make them safe. And after the trauma of October 7 and with the rise of Israel's religious ethnonationalist leaders, Israelis may further conclude that seizing land is the best way to secure their country. The formula driving Israeli diplomacy since Israel's treaty with Egypt in 1979—territory for peace—appears discredited. Back then, Israel agreed to withdraw from the Sinai Peninsula in exchange for normalized bilateral relations. But with the October 7 attack that came from Gaza, which Israel had also previously occupied, controlling land has once again seemed to gain greater currency as a defense strategy. High-tech fences were not enough to keep Israelis out of harm's way. Missile defense and civilian defense infrastructure limit the damage an adversary can inflict, but without taking the fight to the enemy and reoccupying land, some of Israel's leaders argue today, Israel will not be secure.

Such an endgame appears more likely by the day. But it cannot bring the long-term security Israel seeks. Instead, it would leave Israel locked in a cycle of war and global isolation, dragging the United States with it. Israel needs a leader who will question the current definition of victory, acknowledging that true victory is not possible without peace. One does not have to believe in a “new Middle East” where Israel is fully accepted, trading and engaging with its neighbors, to appreciate that there is a different, realistic path forward. That path is not one of perpetual occupation and perpetual war. But for now, the latter is the path Israel is taking.

By Dalia Dassa Kaye

Voir, lire ou entendre : Foreign Affairs

Where Is Israel Heading, When the Only Horizon Its Leaders Offer Is War? Under thoughtless leadership, Israel is taking giant steps towards a regional war, while the world keeps asking itself: What does it want? Send in e-mailSend in e-mail Prime Ministe - 02 octobre 2024
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Under thoughtless leadership, Israel is taking giant steps towards a regional war, while the world keeps asking itself: What does it want?

The State of Israel is in the midst of the most difficult period in its history, under a reckless leadership headed by a man whose only promise he has made and kept to his people was to live by the sword. In remarks made at a new year's cabinet meeting, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu briefly mentioned the 101 hostages whom he has abandoned to suffering and death in Hamas' tunnels in the Gaza Strip, half of whom are no longer alive.

Under its thoughtless leadership, Israel is taking giant steps towards a regional war, while the world keeps asking itself: What does it want? Where is it heading?

For Netanyahu's government, the endgame of war is war
All the honey in the world can't sweeten this Rosh Hashanah
Where is the Israeli opposition that's against more death and destruction?

Ayman Safadi, the Jordanian foreign minister, best captured those feelings in a speech that has gone viral across the globe but has been completely ignored by Israel. At a press conference following a joint celebration by Arab representatives during the UN General Assembly session, Safadi exercised his right to speak and say things all Israelis must hear.

The Israeli prime minister came here today and said that Israel is surrounded by those who want to destroy it, he began. We're here — members of the Muslim-Arab committee, mandated by 57 Arab and Muslim countries — and I can tell you very unequivocally, all of us are willing to guarantee the security of Israel in the context of Israel ending the occupation and allowing for the emergence of a Palestinian state.
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Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi in Amman, Jordan, in September.Credit: Alaa Al Sukhni/ REUTERS

This is not to say that Hamas did not seek to vanquish Israel, that Hezbollah is not a bitter and cruel enemy or that Iran is not seeking the worst for us, but Safadi has served to remind us of an undeniable truth: Under its long years of rule by Netanyahu, Israel has not lifted a finger for the sake of peace with the Palestinians, but the reverse.

Do they have a narrative other than 'I'm going to continue to go to war and kill this and kill that'? he asked. Ask any Israeli official what their plan is for peace, you'll get nothing because they're only thinking of the first step – we're going to destroy Gaza, inflame the West Bank, destroy Lebanon. After that, they have no plan. We have a plan, we have no partner for peace in Israel.

On the eve of Rosh Hashanah 5785, when the only horizon Israel's leaders offer is war, we can only hope that in the coming year we will be blessed with a profound change in leadership and a new vision for the country. May this year and its troubles soon be over.



Voir, lire ou entendre : Haaretz:

After an Unprecedented Iranian Attack, Israel Is in a Regional War - 02 octobre 2024
Haaretz:
After an Unprecedented Iranian Attack, Israel Is in a Regional War

The latest escalation relegates Israel's war with Hamas and even with Hezbollah to second place after the Israeli-Iranian conflict. The U.S., less than five weeks away from the presidential elections, is likely to be drawn into the confrontation, against its will.

After nearly a year of fighting, as of Tuesday evening Israel is involved in a regional war. In the wake of the events of the past two weeks between Israel and Hezbollah, Iran has inserted itself into the heart of the conflict by launching a massive, unprecedented missile attack on Israeli soil. Accordingly, a fierce Israeli reprisal is expected.

Amazingly, the Iranian attack caused no serious casualties, although many homes in the center of the country were damaged from shrapnel, some of it from interceptor missiles. After a little more than an hour, the Home Front Command authorized civilians to leave their protected spaces.

The initial assessment is that Iran launched about 180 ballistic missiles at Israel, most of which were intercepted or landed in open areas. That is about half the number of projectiles Iran fired in its April attack, but this time the proportion of ballistic missiles was greater and, as a result, so was the damage caused.

Iran presumably analyzed the results of the previous attack and learned lessons from it. Nevertheless, it did not effectively penetrate Israeli regional air defenses.

Israelis, especially those living in the center of the country, have never faced an attack on this scale. Nevertheless, civilians demonstrated a high level of personal discipline while the air force and the air defense system saw off the attack with aplomb, with the help of the United States. The attack was supposed to target several military and security installations, including air force bases, but it was also intended to hit civilian areas and cause deaths and terrorize the population.

The latest escalation puts all the sides to the conflict in an entirely different situation, in which Israel's war with Hamas and even with Hezbollah are relegated to second place after the Israeli-Iranian conflict.

Secondary risks are also growing domestically, as evidenced by the killing spree by terrorists in Jaffa that left six Israelis dead and is believed to have been intended to coincide with the attack from Iran. This is the most deadly terror attack to have occurred inside the Green Line since the October 7 Hamas massacre. Tel Aviv has not suffered a terror attack on that scale since the second intifada.

An incident like that can't help but arouse greater feelings of anxiety and insecurity on the part of the public, no less than a massive barrage of ballistic missiles. We have to take into account similar attempts by Palestinians in the West Bank, at the behest and financing of Iran and Hezbollah. There may also be attempts to recruit extremist elements or criminal gangs among Israeli Arabs.

There is no doubt that Israel will respond, and very forcefully, to the massive Iranian attack. Rear Adm. Daniel Hagari, the Israel Defense Forces spokesman, said the attack will have consequences. The United States, which is less than five weeks away from presidential elections, is likely to be drawn into the confrontation, against its will. This is a regional and global crisis that may have far-reaching consequences for Israel's security, but also for the global economy and America's global standing. The exchange of blows between Israel and Iran is expected to continue, as made clear by a threat issued by the Iranian delegation to the United Nations.

Just a few days have passed since the celebrations in Israel over the demise of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah and already the situation has undergone a complete change. As is often the case, it is unwise to engage in victory celebrations in the middle of a long war against a determined and sophisticated enemy. It would have been better to wait with the baklava.

Although Iran was not directly harmed by the Israeli attack in Lebanon, it did eliminate the second most important person in the regional axis of resistance after Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Tehran made the decision to attack Israel a few days ago. The IDF spokesman issued directives calling on all Israelis to be vigilant.

Under the circumstances, the fighting in Gaza, which until the middle of September was designated the main front, has now fallen down the list of priorities for Israel. This is likely to undermine any chances of reaching a hostage deal, which in any case has been in a state of suspended animation for a long time. Even before Tuesday's Iranian attack, the IDF had been calling up for reservists for duty in the north. Now, the call-up will almost certainly be even bigger amid a regional crisis and the risk of further escalation on a number of fronts.

Depending on the U.S.

The Shin Bet security service disclosed this week, albeit without making many of the details public, that it has uncovered several Iranian attempts to assassinate senior Israeli officials, both in Israel and abroad. Iran uses Israeli agents, some of whom were recruited online with the promise of payment. It found fertile ground for these efforts, in part within Israel's criminal underworld. It's reasonable to assume these efforts will continue.

The immediate Iranian threat only underscores Israel's dependence on the Americans – those same Americans whom Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has driven crazy with every step he took in recent weeks. Israel is dependent on the United States not only to coordinate aerial defenses, but also for a continued supply of arms for its offensive operations.

These facts have somehow escaped Netanyahu's die-hard fans who, following Israel's successes in Beirut, are now crazed with a new fantasy – attacking Iran's nuclear facilities without coordinating with America. The messianists' views on this issue are already being heard loud and clear in television studios. But the reality is that when it comes to Iran's nuclear problem, Israel must act in coordination with America, both to ensure that significant, long-term damage is done and to obtain necessary assistance in both defending itself and attacking.

What matters more than the talk on TV, however, is that these ideas are infiltrating the surroundings of the decision makers. Netanyahu himself decided Monday, at the height of the regional storm, to appeal directly to Iranians in a video urging them to topple the ayatollahs' repressive regime.
Demonstrators wave flags of Iran and Hezbollah during a rally celebrating after Iran launched a barrage of missiles at Israel in response to the killing of Hezbollah's leader Hassan Nasrallah, in Tehran.
On this issue, it's worth recalling the warning that journalist Thomas Friedman delivered in his New York Times column around a month ago. Friedman said the Biden administration fears that Netanyahu is trying to drag it into a direct war with Iran that would include attacks on its nuclear facilities and in the process would also affect the outcome of the November election.

Netanyahu, needless to say, isn't exactly praying for a victory by the Democratic candidate, Vice President Kamala Harris. The United States will help Israel now due to both its commitment in principle to Israel and its recognition of Israel's strategic importance to American interests. But Biden, Harris and their advisers will continue to be suspicious.

The return of 'shock and awe'

Twenty-four years after leaving Lebanon, ostensibly forever, and 18 years after returning for a brief and unsuccessful adventure, the Israel Defense Forces is returning to southern Lebanon. On Monday night, troops entered for what was described this time as a focused and time-limited operation, which at the moment is being directed at the outskirts of Shi'ite Muslim villages and dense terrain that are relatively close to the border with Israel.

The IDF General Staff and the Israeli political leadership are hoping that intensive military activity there, for a few weeks, will encounter weaker resistance than is usually thought, given the serious blows that Hezbollah sustained in the aerial and intelligence attacks over the past two weeks.

The moves on the ground are intended to complete what has already been achieved and to force Hezbollah and its Iranian patron to agree to a pullback from the border area, in a manner that will persuade many of Israelis that they can return safely to their homes on the southern side of the border, after a year of forced exile. Iran's Tuesday evening attack will affect Israel's priorities and future actions, primarily regarding the Israel Air Force.

In the light of the hostilities along the border until now, and what is beginning to be uncovered on its Lebanese side, it looks as though Israel has no other way, at the moment, to get the abandoned communities repopulated. But the history of the previous confrontations shows that the Israeli plans tend to shatter on the wall of reality; in war, and certainly in a ground offensive, the unexpected happens. Usually the enemy doesn't volunteer to play its part in the plans that were drawn up.

What is inarguable is that Hezbollah is in a completely different place than it was a few weeks ago. On October 8, 2023, when Nasrallah decided to join the war that Hamas launched in the south the day before, he restricted the fire of his organization's militants to long-distance: antitank missiles, short-range rockets and afterward also drones.

The idea was to pin down large Israeli numbers of forces along the Lebanon border and thus to make his contribution to the Palestinians' struggle in Gaza, without sending his forces to attack inside Israel. Nasrallah's strategy proved itself for about 11 months, even though about 500 of his troops were killed in incidents along the border and a number of the organization's ranking figures were also killed.

When Israel decided, in mid-September, to move to a new stage in the campaign – to move actively to enable the residents to return and to make Lebanon the main arena of the war – the price Hezbollah was paying started to skyrocket.

A series of developments – the pagers and walkie-talkie attacks that have been attributed to Israel, the assassination of Nasrallah and two of his top commanders, Ibrahim Akil and Ali Karaki, the elimination of the entire hierarchy of Radwan Force, the systematic aerial offensive that brought about massive damage to Hezbollah's medium and long-range weapons stockpiles – created a completely new situation along the border, even before IDF troops entered southern Lebanon.

In connection with the Iraq War that began in 2003, the Americans developed an offensive concept they dubbed shock and awe, whose main element is an opening blow that indeed shocks all the enemy's systems and degrades its capabilities. That's exactly what Israel did to Hezbollah in the past few weeks, albeit after almost a year of indecisive sparring without apparent strategic results.

A significant element of the achievement is due to the patient work of the Israel Air Force over the past year, in ensuring the aerial supremacy of its planes and drones in the skies of Lebanon. A large part of Hezbollah's antiaircraft capabilities were located, destroyed or bypassed, thereby greatly reducing the risk to the Israeli aircraft and allowing them broader freedom of action than had been anticipated.

The most blatant evidence of the achievements to date is the limited damage Hezbollah has inflicted on the Israeli home front. It appears that the primary reason for Hezbollah's limited response to date is related to the shock that is gripping the organization's top ranks, and not due to a lack of medium range missiles. Despite Israel's significant strikes on Hezbollah's missile stockpiles, the group still has many hundreds of missiles and it's likely that once it pulls its command back together, it will start firing more accurately.

Hezbollah's leadership – more accurately, the new top ranks — is in a state of shock given what has happened. Hezbollah based itself on a veteran command group, which sprang up with Nasrallah in the organization amid its founding at the beginning of the 1980s, and reached their senior positions already almost two decades ago. Almost all those people are gone – either assassinated over the year or eliminated in the past two weeks.

Their replacements are finding a battered and bewildered organization, in which the chains of command and control have become unhinged. A difficulty apparently exists in executing coordinated attacks on the basis of the existing firepower plans. The communications networks were abandoned after the episode of the pagers and walkie-talkies, a large part of the stocks of missiles were destroyed and there are undoubtedly personnel who are apprehensive about going to the concealed sites of additional launchers, for fear they will be killed. Most oppressive of all, perhaps, is the feeling of breached intelligence.

Even so, a ground entry into southern Lebanon, even limited, will be a different story, more difficult. It's likely that Hezbollah's defensive systems in the villages, and their secrets, are in part visible to Israeli intelligence, but it's more difficult to destroy via air power the subterranean infrastructure of bunkers and tunnels that the organization has created near the border. That's the main reason for the decision to go in on the ground. And as a result, two major difficulties can be expected, which recall what the IDF faced in its invasion of the Gaza Strip at the end of last October.

First, the enemy's resistance need not rest on complex and systematic military systems, but on guerrilla squads that are positioned well in critical areas and could inflict losses on the IDF. Second, the time dimension: The execution of the IDF's plan in Gaza took far more time than had been anticipated, because it turned out that the interplay between built-up areas and underground zones greatly lengthens the duration of the operation and complicates it. Anyone who expects to see tanks and armored vehicles barreling across the terrain, in the style of the Six-Day War in Sinai, is going to be disappointed.

On Thursday the IDF revealed that special operations units had carried out more than 70 raids across the fence, since last October. In their course, combat zones of Hezbollah were uncovered, approach tunnels that enable them to draw close to the border without being seen, and multiple means of combat. There are many more similar compounds in open areas along the fence. Other targets of the operation will be the villages on the line of contact. At the same time, the IDF's instructions to the population of the south to evacuate their homes extend far to the north of that, until the outskirts of Tyre.

The tunes we're hearing from the officers, and through them to the public via the retired generals in the TV studios, are quite familiar: This is a limited move with the aim of pushing back the terrorists from the border, restoring security and bringing back the resident of the evacuated communities. The risks, which as usual are mentioned less, are also known: The slippery slope lies between the first hill that's seized in order to carry out the mission, and the second one, which is stormed in order to protect the forces on the first hill from fire. Thus you sometimes find yourself stuck in a foreign land for 18 years, maybe more. Only one thing seems sure: the land shall not rest quiet, certainly not for 40 years.

Voir, lire ou entendre : Haaretz:

Moyen-Orient : la colère au cœur d'une violence inextinguible - 01 octobre 2024
The Conversation FR.

Moyen-Orient : la colère au cœur d'une violence inextinguible


Dans Géopolitique de la colère. De la globalisation heureuse au grand courroux, dont une seconde édition actualisée et enrichie est parue le 29 août 2024 aux éditions Le Cavalier Bleu, Myriam Benraad, professeure en relations internationales à l'Université internationale Schiller à Paris, aborde la question des émotions dont découlent de nombreux conflits contemporains et qui contaminent toutes les interactions sociales et tous les rapports politiques. La réflexion qui suit, tirée de cet ouvrage, appréhende la colère comme un affect dominant dans le déclenchement et la prolongation d'une majorité de crises récentes au Moyen-Orient – celles à Gaza et en Syrie plus particulièrement. Comment, au sein de cet espace géopolitique singulier, des adversaires répondent-ils à des expressions réciproques de rage ?

Loin de faciliter la résolution d'un conflit, la colère produit dans la plupart des cas une inéluctable escalade de la violence. Il est en effet rare que cette émotion façonne des comportements de conciliation ; au contraire, dans sa dimension destructrice, la colère provoque et entretient les antagonismes entre groupes et communautés, conduisant à tous types d'agressions. Elle constitue une prédisposition de longue durée qui prédit le devenir des guerres, comme l'illustre notamment l'actuelle configuration au Moyen-Orient où elle a aggravé les hostilités en engendrant des conséquences toujours plus dévastatrices pour les civils et en entravant tout réel pourparlers de paix.

Plus la colère d'un ennemi désigné est perçue comme injustifiée, plus elle alimente l'appétence de représailles, conformément au pouvoir dont la partie vengeresse dispose et vice versa. Au-delà de la conflagration à Gaza, que l'on pourrait analyser sous l'angle d'un « cycle infernal de colère » rendu encore plus insoluble depuis les développements dramatiques de l'automne 2023, la Syrie, qui reste instable après une décennie de guerre civile, fournit un autre exemple édifiant. Plongée dans les méandres d'une impasse politique et humanitaire encore d'actualité, sur fond de résurgence autoritaire, elle rend compte des répercussions ravageuses de colères locales entremêlées à une succession d'ingérences étrangères.

Dans le premier cas, bien avant la tragédie du 7-Octobre et les événements qui ont suivi, à l'origine d'une séquence de colère régionale et internationale inédite, les Palestiniens de Cisjordanie et de Gaza avaient pour habitude de se rassembler lors de « Jours de colère » pour protester contre l'occupation et la colonisation de leurs terres par Israël. Plus que tout autre conflit, la question israélo-palestinienne met à jour le poids de la colère dans l'impossibilité de parvenir à un règlement pacifique entre deux parties que tout semble opposer.

Depuis la fondation de l'État d'Israël, les affrontements se sont ainsi inlassablement succédé sans jamais aboutir à une résolution satisfaisante de part et d'autre du spectre conflictuel. Au fil du temps, et de l'échec de toutes les négociations, en particulier des accords d'Oslo de 1993, l'horizon d'une sortie de crise n'a cessé de s'éloigner en risquant aujourd'hui de disparaître purement et simplement. Historique, le conflit semble en effet avoir atteint un point de non-retour, l'optique d'une option à deux États s'étant distancée au point qu'elle n'est plus qu'une sorte d'injonction sans contenu véritable.

Israéliens et Palestiniens se battent pour un même territoire depuis des décennies et ne sont jamais parvenus à un quelconque compromis, à l'exception de quelques frêles pourparlers de paix sous tutelle américaine. D'interminables séquences de colère et de ripostes représentent la première source d'ignorance mutuelle et ont conduit à l'impasse diplomatique et militaire que l'on connaît. De la première guerre israélo-arabe de 1948 jusqu'à la conflagration de Gaza, en passant par la guerre des Six Jours de 1967, celle du Kippour en 1973 et celle dite des Raisins de la colère en 1996, le conflit ressemble au fond à une série d'explosions de fureurs que rien n'a jamais réussi à arrêter.

À chaque nouvelle provocation, chaque nouvelle phase de violence d'un côté comme de l'autre, chaque nouvelle destruction ou mort s'ensuit une exaspération immédiate qui, en retour, ne fait que nourrir les multiples désirs de vengeance. L'incompréhension est aujourd'hui d'autant plus indépassable que chaque nouvelle attaque est vécue comme gratuite, l'œuvre perverse d'un adversaire qui n'a jamais eu pour intention d'engager un quelconque dialogue.

Tous les conflits prolongés entre groupes sont saturés de colère – l'antécédent émotionnel le plus significatif de l'action agressive – et exacerbés par la perpétuation d'attaques à travers une spirale de la rétribution. La longue guerre entre Israël et le Hamas à Gaza, axée autour d'incessantes réponses à des affronts ainsi qu'aux réactions emportées que ces derniers ont suscitées dans les deux camps, est la plus instructive en ce sens. Elle éclaire comment la colère ressentie dans la durée, à la fois du côté israélien et du côté palestinien, a abouti à une escalade sans précédent.

Les Palestiniens, notamment, n'ont cessé d'évoluer au prisme d'un sentiment d'injustice face à leur traitement par Israël, ce qui a conditionné beaucoup de leurs réflexes, même si rien ne saurait justifier les exactions abjectes qui ont été perpétrées par le Hamas au nom de cette cause. Suivant une dynamique pernicieuse, les attaques palestiniennes ont surtout installé une rancœur tenace parmi la population israélienne qui n'arrive plus à envisager une possibilité de paix et justifie donc la poursuite de la guerre en dépit des nombreuses réprobations externes.
Cet extrait est issu de « Géopolitique de la colère. De la globalisation heureuse au grand courroux », de Myriam Benraad, dont la deuxième édition vient de paraître. Le Cavalier Bleu

Dans le second cas, celui de la Syrie, la colère s'est révélée centrale dans les processus d'identification et de catégorisation négatives entre communautés, créant un ressentiment tout aussi palpable. Dans le dédale des acteurs de cette guerre, qui ne saurait se limiter à une classification simpliste entre le régime de Bachar Al-Assad et ses opposants, chaque Syrien a éprouvé une profonde colère dès le printemps 2011. Au fil des offensives, des sièges militaires et des destructions massives infligées aux populations, cette émotion opposée à une situation intolérable a mué en norme, y compris hors du pays où jamais les vues et positions sur cette crise n'ont paru aussi tranchées et définitives.

Une décennie plus tard, le régime syrien continue de faire face à des manifestations de colère régulières, quoique plus rares. Entretenir ce sentiment représente à l'évidence une arme de choix pour ses détracteurs qui dénoncent une entreprise de reconquête ne connaissant aucune limite et aucun frein à la brutalité. Le vent n'a certes pas tourné en faveur des forces d'opposition encore présentes sur le terrain, mais leur colère, immense, freinera durablement tout effort de pacification d'une société meurtrie.

Par Myriam Benraad du Département International Relations and Diplomacy, Schiller International University


Voir, lire ou entendre : The Conversation FR.

Why Does the Media Twist Stories about Israel? - 01 octobre 2024
Medium daily digest
Why Does the Media Twist Stories about Israel?

I've got some questions –
Hasan Nasrallah, the current leader of Hezbollah, picture from Wikipedia

Hezbollah, which occupies Lebanon and has its own SHIITE MUSLIM political party and ARMY, has been shooting rockets into Israel since the day after the Hamas massacre on October 7, 2023.

Why isn't every news outlet mentioning the over 8,000 rockets that Hezbollah has rained down on Israel in the past 11 months?

Hezbollah attacks started long before, and never had anything to do with Palestinians, so what's their goal aside from following Iran's orders to attack Israel from all sides? If Lebanon, Iran or its Hezbollah boys cared , why are Palestinians forced to live as stateless citizens in refugee camps in Lebanon and why are they prohibited from a large group of professions?

It's awful that an Iranian proxy has taken over and put Lebanese citizens at risk — so who should be blamed when Israel retaliates against Hezbollah rocket fire that has burned thousands of acres and destroyed hundreds of homes?.

Even Human Rights Watch has noticed that Hezbollah is a terrorist organization whose very existence is built around killing Jews and destroying Israel. The U.S. Council on Foreign Relations recognizes Hezbollah as another Iranian proxy whose goal is to obliterate Israel. The Wilson Center is also clear about Hezbollah's goals of genocide and destruction, which come directly from its funding source, Iran.

So, what's going on with the media?

AP News shrieks: ISRAEL STRIKES KILL 492 in Lebanon's deadliest day of conflict since 2006. Really, AP News? Do you think that Israel just killed those terrorists with no provocation whatsoever?

Or how about CBS News 9/24/24: Lebanon says 558 Killed as Israel bombs Hezbollah. If Hezbollah didnt attack, Israel wouldn't need to retaliate. How do the pro-terror folks think Israel should retaliate against 8,000 rockets?

Honest Reporting gets it right, as usual. It's clear about why Israel is retaliating against Hezbollah, responding to daily rocket fire from Hezbollah terrorists that OCCUPY LEBANON. Hm, maybe that's what pro-terrorists are talking about when they use the word, “occupation.”

Why is the media claiming that Israel is causing an escalation against Hezbollah after 11 months of daily rocket fire into Israel? Do they mean to say that Israel is not allowed to retaliate or to try to stop Hezbollah's further attempts at killing Jews and destroying the entire country? Do all these Media outlets think that Israel should negotiate a peace with terrorists who have no desire for peace with Israel or the West, who have lied again and again, and speak publicly of their plans to destroy Israel? Does the word genocide ring a bell?

Of course, Al Jazeera is going to claim that Israel is escalating this war — as if 11 months of daily rocket fire from Lebanon is no big deal. As if 70,000 Israelis haven't been forced out of their homes, acres of fields haven't burned, and daily rockets aiming at citizen populations is not enough of a provocation?

Regardless of Israel's mistakes and the current government's failure to protect its citizens from the horrific 10/7/23 massacre, or to bring the hostages home, is there anyone in the world who believes that Iran and its proxies are hoping for a two-state solution, or any kind of peace?

Is there anyone in the world who is unclear about what would happen if Israel stopped fighting back?

#Bring Them Home Now #

By Am Yisrael Chai

Voir, lire ou entendre : Medum daily digest